This study examines determinants of excessive executive compensation in PRC firms using 8,100 firm-year observations from [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009]. Employing an industry benchmarked excessive pay proxy, this study finds that CEO duality and ownership dispersion have significant positive associations with the probability of overpaying the executives. The presence of a large outside shareholder is negatively associated with the likelihood of excessive executive compensation. Results from this study have important implications for various stakeholders. For example, the PRC authorities need to further strengthen the corporate governance and constrain the power of management over the pay-setting process. More institutional investors could be encouraged to enter the PRC market to play a bigger role in monitoring managers. This paper makes an original contribution to the PRC executive compensation literature by providing unique insights into drivers of excessive executive compensation.
Introduction
The level of executive compensation is a topic of significant interest and debate. The recent global financial crisis has drawn considerable public attention on the nature of excessive executive compensation. In addition there have been a number of recent cases very critical of senior executives receiving generous pay despite investors" dramatic losses (Bebchuk et al., 2010; Mintzburg, 2009 ). The debate surrounding executives" overpay evolves around the world and the People"s Republic of China (hereafter PRC) is not an exception. During the past decade, the compensation for the executives in the PRC has been rising. In recent years there have been widespread concerns that some senior executives are overly paid and their compensation bears little connection with the firms" performance. For example, a recent report 7 released by the China Ministry of Finance shows that in 2008, of 1,597 non-financing firms listed in the PRC, the net income dropped by 31.48% compared with 2007, whilst the average executive compensation increased by 23.95%. A study on the excessive executive compensation in PRC firms is, therefore, both timely and imperative.
Since the market-oriented reform implementation in the late 1970s, the executive pay-setting in PRC firms has experienced a transformation from a fixed salary system to a more flexible performanceoriented model (Firth et al., 2007) . With better recognition of management"s contribution to a firm" performance, more compensation incentive (mostly short term cash-based) plans are starting to be introduced in the PRC firms. However, recent studies (e.g. Kato and Long, 2006) find that payperformance sensitivity in PRC firms is generally low and the link between executive compensation and 7 The report is entitled ' business performance needs to be enhanced. During the market-oriented reform, more autonomy and discretionary power was granted to the senior executives of PRC State Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOEs). The development of regulatory oversight and corporate governance, however, did not keep up with the pace of the reform. This lack of monitoring causes serious insider control, managerial corruption and rent-seeking problems (Chen et al., 2010) .
Early executive compensation theory views the compensation as one means to relieve the principalagency conflict by designing an optimal contracting by the board (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ). The emerging literature posits that pay-setting process is actually influenced by managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2002) . Prior studies (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Conyon and He, 2004; Core et al., 1999) indicate that weak corporate governance could result in the abuse of managerial power and thus lead to excessive executive compensation. Weak corporate governance could give CEOs and other executives considerable discretion over the pay-setting process which could allow executives to skew the contract in their favour and extract greater pay. Corporate governance in the PRC is characterised by insider control, inadequate transparency and disclosure (Chen et al., 2006; Lin, 2001 ; Liu and Lu, 2007) . In comparison to western economies, PRC firms only recently began to establish remuneration committees. This lack of oversight gives the senior executives the opportunity to manipulate their power and seek excessive pay.
The main research question of this study is to investigate determinants of excessive executive compensation in the PRC firms. Using managerial power theory, this study posits that firms with weak corporate governance (measured via board features and ownership structure) will be more likely to pay executives excessive compensation. By examining 8,100 observations of PRC firms from 2003 -2009 , results suggest that firms with CEO duality, smaller outside shareholders and higher ownership dispersion have higher probability of overpaying executives. This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. Firstly, although there have been studies (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2007; Kato and Long, 2006) on executive compensation in PRC firms, little attention has been paid to drivers of excessive executive compensation. This research bridges the gap in the literature. Secondly, the issue of increasing income gap between the executives and employees in the PRC is becoming a major social concern (Xinhua News, 2011). Given PRC is still a socialist country and collectivism is claimed the key cultural value, examining which firms are overpaying the executives and determinants of the excessive executive compensation is pivotal and interesting. Thirdly, results from this study have important implications for policy makers and PRC authorities. For example, PRC stock exchanges could consider regulations that single out those firms overpaying the executives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of executive compensation theories and develops the hypotheses. The research design for the study is outlined in Section 3 and is followed by the reporting of results in Section 4. Concluding remarks are detailed in Section 5.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Theoretical framework
Two leading theories explain the arrangement of executive compensation. One theory is optimal contracting and the other theory is managerial power. Optimal contracting theory historically was the prevalent theory in the executive compensation area. With the theories genesis in agency theory, optimal contracting theory conjectures a board of directors can use the executive compensation as a mechanism to align the managers" interest with shareholders" interest (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . It posits that to partially mitigate the agency problems, board seeks to design optional compensation contract to provide managers with efficient incentives and maximise shareholders" wealth (Core et al., 2003; Fried, 2003, 2006) . The essence of the optimal contracting theory is that proper executive pay arrangement can be used as a tool to reduce the agency cost.
However, optimal contracting theory is subject to several limitations. Firstly, it assumes an "arm"s length bargaining" between the board and executives whilst in reality it may not necessarily be true (Bebchuk et al., 2004, p.10) . Factors such as "management control over director appointment, board social dynamics, directors" insufficient and distorted economic incentives, and informational barriers" (Bebchuk et al., 2002, p.11) can prohibit the board from engaging in an arm"s length bargaining. Secondly, constraints imposed by market forces and social forces may be weak and allow substantial deviations from arm"s-length outcomes. Thirdly, due to the limitations of shareholders" voting mechanisms, shareholders rarely disapprove the option plans or constrain managerial power over executive compensation (Bebchuk et al., 2004) .
In light of the limitations of optimal contracting theory, managerial power theory argues that executives pursue self-interest in the pay arrangement process (Finkelstein, 1992; Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . Bebchuk and Fried (2003, p.5 ) define the managerial power as "the influence that mangers can exert over the compensation contract setting". In contrast to the optimal contracting theory, managerial power theory views the pay-setting process as part of the agency problem rather than a remedy to the agency problem. The board may not necessarily be able to represent the shareholders interest in negotiating the executives" pay and may fail to sign an arm"s length contract. As executives are rational individuals, they may use their power to seek higher pay, which causes the "rent extraction" problem (Bebchuk et al., 2002, p.5) . In addition, managers exert power over the board of directors and outsider consultants through the selection of the board of directors which may result in excessive pay. 
Executive compensation in the PRC
The arrangement for executive compensation in the PRC firms went through a reform accompanying the privatisation process of the PRC SOEs. Under the centrally planned economy, all PRC firms were owned by the State (Firth et al., 2007) . The executives of the PRC SOEs were paid a flat salary with no connection to a firms" performance. As the SOEs must remit all retained profits to the government, there was no performance based pay or incentive schemes for the management (Kato and Long, 2006) . Since 1978, the PRC government started to separate the State from enterprises and the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges accelerated the privatisation of SOEs. With the issuance of more shares to the public, the State"s ownership in the SOEs was gradually reduced. More performance based incentive schemes started to be introduced into the enterprises though share option plans were only adopted by a few firms.
The PRC privatisation was only a partial privatisation which leaves the ownership structure of PRC listed firm with unique characteristics. For most PRC firms, the State still owns around 40% of the firm"s shares and is the single dominant shareholder (Xu, 2004; Firth et al., 2007; Conyon and He, 2011) . The other shareholders generally hold a very small percentage of shares. Compared to western economies, there are few institutional investors in the PRC market and the shareholding of the institutional investors is limited (Firth et al., 2007) . Whilst the State still appoints political officials to be CEOs of SOEs, the close relationship between the government and senior executives leads to little monitoring of managerial power.
During the market-oriented reform, the managerial power of PRC executives of partially privatised enterprises has dramatically increased (Chen et al., 2006) . The executives are now responsible for operations, investment, personnel, employee welfare and other major decisions. However, the development of corporate governance and regulatory mechanisms has lagged behind the managerial power release process (Chen et In general, the lack of regulatory enforcement, little use of long-term incentive plans, lack of institutional investor influence, poor board oversight, and insufficient information disclosure on executive compensation renders PRC market vulnerable to managerial pay abuse.
Determinants of excessive executive compensation
Based on the review of executive compensation theories and the background to PRC executive paysetting, this paper asserts that managerial power theory is more applicable to PRC firms than the optimal contracting theory. Due to the prevalence of managerial influence over director appointment, poor regulatory environment and weak shareholder rights, it is unlikely there will be arm"s length bargaining between the board of directors and executives. On the contrary, powerful executives in PRC firms have both the incentive and ability to engage in private rent seeking over the compensation setting process. Consistent with Bebchuk and Fried (2003) , this study views that an effective board and proper ownership structure 8 can be the structural mechanism to constrain the executive power, leading to lower possibility of excessive executive pay.
CEO duality is a frequently examined board feature that may influence the board pay-setting process. Where the CEO and board chairman are the same person it is easier for the CEO to control information available to other board members and to hinder effective monitoring (Otten and Heugens, 2007) . In addition, CEO duality concentrates power in the CEO"s position, which gives more discretion to management. Thus, the presence of CEO duality reduces the possibility of lower levels of remuneration offered to CEOs (Petra and Dorata, 2008) . There is considerable literature (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Lee et al., 2008) on the impact of the composition of the board of directors, specifically, the number of inside and independent directors and the impact that has on executive compensation. Boards with more independent directors are in a better position to monitor managers and to reduce excessive executive pay (Boyd, 1994; Lambert, 1993) . High board independence can lead to more effective corporate governance and strengthen the positive association between firm performance and pay (Lee et al., 2008 ). In a jurisdiction with weak corporate governance such as the PRC, executives will have more chances to exploit the managerial power and influence the pay-setting process to gain rents. Adopting the managerial power theory, this study asserts that managerial influence over the board can enable executives to seek rents through excessive executive compensation. Firms with a strong board could constrain managerial power and hence there is less chance of overpaying the executives. Based on the literature (e.g. Conyon and He, 2011; Lee et al., 2008; Newman and Mozes, 1999) , the board strength is captured through four aspects: CEO duality, board independence, board size, and existence of a remuneration committee. Thus, the following hypotheses are developed.
H1a: There is a positive association between CEO duality and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
H1b: There is a negative association between board independence and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
H1c: There is a positive association between size of board of directors and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
H1d: There is a negative association between the existence of a remuneration committee and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
Ownership structure has important influences on the pattern of executive compensation (Core et al., 1999) . Given the high costs in monitoring management, only large investors can afford to actively execute scrutiny over the executives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Khan et al., 2005) . Shivadasani (1993) and Core et al. (1999) , for example, hypothesize that outside directors with large shareholdings may potentially reduce entrenchment of a chief executive and have a negative influence on a CEO"s remuneration. In addition, the nature of the ownership also affects the pay-setting process. Firth et al. (2007) find that state ownership acts to reduce compensation levels in PRC firms. Furthermore, dispersed ownership will likely cause the free-rider problem and weaken the supervision of management. Bebchuk et al. (2002) suggest that managerial power tends to be higher in firms with a more diversified ownership structure. Conyon and He (2011) conclude that executive compensation and CEO incentives are lower in PRC SOEs and firms with concentrated ownership.
Consistent with the prior literature, this study posits that firms with a large outside shareholder, is controlled by the State and has lower ownership dispersion will have lower managerial power and hence lower likelihood of overpaying. The following hypotheses are, therefore, advanced.
H2a: There is a negative association between the shareholding of the largest shareholder and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
H2b: There is a negative association between state owned enterprises status and the probability of excessive executive compensation.
H2c: There is a positive association between ownership dispersion and the probability of excessive executive compensation. The executive compensation and financial data in this paper is collected from the CSMAR and Genius Finance database. The board characteristics data are manually collected from firms" annual reports.
Variable description and proxies
Executive compensation can comprise cash compensation and equity-based incentive scheme. Prior studies (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2011) note that PRC firms mainly use cash compensation scheme whilst stock options are rarely adopted. In addition it is difficult to value the stock options in the PRC market (Chen et There is no general consensus on how to measure whether the executives are excessively paid. Prior studies (e.g. Nichols and Subramaniam 2001; Wade et al. 2006 ) calculate the excess pay as a residual from a regression model. However, this model is criticised for not being able to distinguish excessive pay from other regression errors. Moreover, the academic models are seldom adopted by financial analysts or stock exchanges ). Practitioners and stock exchanges tend to use industry peers to benchmark a firm"s executive compensation 12 (Gong et al. 2011 ). Of various Asian stock exchanges, the Taiwan Stock Exchange specifically prescribes the industry-based criteria for identifying excessive executive compensation. The criteria are as follows: (a) for a profit-making firm, if the ratio of average compensation for directors and supervisors to net income is higher than the industry average whilst the net income is lower than the industry average; (b) for a loss-making firm, if the average compensation for directors and supervisors is higher than one million New Taiwan dollar; (c) for a firm reporting a loss in the consolidated financial statement, if the average compensation for directors and supervisors is higher than two million New Taiwan dollar; and (d) for a firm with two consecutive years" loss, if the average compensation for directors and supervisors increased between the two years. Firms that fall into any of the four criteria are labelled paying excessive executive compensation, which will be reported to the public by the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 13 for the profit-making firms. Based on the empirical results, they note that the original criterion (a) is subject to a firm size bias. Specifically, only small firms will be identified as overpaying when based on Criterion (a). By comparing the four measures they constructed, confer that the most robust measure is 9 Financing firms are excluded because of the different reporting requirements to other firms. Consistent with Lin et al. (2009) these firms are excluded from the sample due to the difficulty in calculating an industry average when including the loss-making firms and only a very small number of loss-making firms fall into the excessive compensation criteria. Finally, due to the difficulty in identifying an ultimate controller, firms that are controlled by universities are also excluded from the sample. 10 The balance of the panel is as follows. There are 130 firms with 1 year of data, 122 firms with 2 years of data (244 firm-year observations), 191 firms with 3 years of data (573 firm-year observations), 175 firms with 4 years of data (700 firm-year observations), 187 firms with 5 years of data (935 firm-year observations), 341 firms with 6 years of data (2046 firm-year observations), 496 firms with 7 years of data (3472 firm-year observations). 11 The cash compensation is a sum of salary, bonus, stipends and other benefits. 12 However, there are mounting controversies about which peers should be selected (Bizjak et al. 2011 ). 13 The four measures are (i) if the ratio of average compensation for directors and supervisors to net income is higher than the industry average whilst the net income is lower than the industry average; (ii) if the average compensation for directors and supervisors is higher than industry average whilst the net income is lower than the industry average; (iii) if the ratio of average compensation for directors and supervisors to net income is higher than the industry average whilst the ROE is lower than the industry average; (iv) if the average compensation for directors and supervisors is higher than industry average whilst the ROE is lower than the industry average. their third criterion, which defines executive compensation as excessive when the ratio of average compensation for directors and supervisors to net income is higher than the industry average whilst the ROE is lower than the industry average.
In line with , this paper measures excessive executive compensation (denoted Excess) using industry based benchmark. The dummy variable Excess is scored one [1] if the ratio of total cash compensation for the top three highest paid executives to net income of a firm is higher than industry average whilst a firm"s ROE 14 is lower than industry average in time period t; otherwise it is scored zero [0].
Based on the hypotheses, the determinants tested focus on two aspects; namely board features and ownership structure. Board features are captured by four measures, namely, CEO duality, board independence, board size and existence of a remuneration committee. For CEO duality (denoted Dual), a firm is scored one when the chairman and the CEO are different people; otherwise, it is scored zero [0]. Board independence (denoted IndDir) is measured as the proportion of independent directors on the Board of Directors. Board size (denoted BoardSize) is the total number of directors sitting on the board of firm at the end of time period t. A dummy variable is constructed to capture the existence of a remuneration committee (denoted RemCommm), where a firm with a remuneration committee is scored one [1] ; otherwise it is scored zero [0].
With regards to the ownership structure variables, top shareholding (denoted TopShare) is measured as the percentage of shareholding of the top one shareholder. An indicator variable SOE is constructed to capture the nature of the firm"s ultimate controller. SOE is scored one [1] if in time period t a firm is a State Owned Enterprise; otherwise scored zero [0] . OwnD is the proxy for ownership dispersion, where the sum of the shareholding of second to tenth shareholder in time period t is larger than the shareholding of the top one shareholder, it is scored one [1] ; otherwise scored zero [0].
To control for a potential size effect, firm size (denoted FSize) is measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets as of the end of time period t. The leverage level (denoted Lev) is captured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as of the end of time period t. Lagged return on assets (denoted ROA) is used to proxy past financial performance. It is measured as the ratio of net profit after income tax and interest of firmi in time period t-1 to total assets as of the end of time period t-1. StcCom is constructed to indicate whether a firm has a stock compensation plan for the managers. To consider the cross-sectional influence of industry, economic region and time, 6 year, 2 economic region and 11 industry 15 dummy variables are included in the regression model. Table 1 provides a summary of all variable descriptions.
14 ROE is measured as the ratio of net profit after income tax and interest of firm i in time period t to total assets as of the end of time period t. 15 Six year dummies are constructed to indicate whether a firm is from any of 2003 -2009. Two reginal dummies are constructed to indicate whether a firm is from Central, Western or other parts of China. 11 industry dummies are constructed to indicate whether a firm is from any of the 12 industries: agriculture, communication, construction, IT, manufacturing, mining, real estate, services, ttranportation, utilities, wholesale and retail and others.
Table 1.Variable description
The following model is thus defined to test the hypotheses: PRO (Excessi,t) = ∅ (α0 + β1 Duali,t + β2 IndDiri,t + β3 BoardSizei,t + β4 RemCommmi,t + β5TopSharei,t +β6 SOEi,t + β7 OwnDisp,t + γ1 FSizei,t + γ2 Levi,t + γ3 ROAi,t + γ4 StcComi,t + ∑δ1 Year +∑δ2 Reg + ∑δ3 Ind) + εj (1) With reference to different industry sectors, Table 2 Panel B shows that executives from the mining industry received the highest compensation while senior management in the agricultural industry is the lowest paid. The average executive pay in the real estate industry is the second highest and the best paid executives are also from the real estate sector. This might due to the property boom in the PRC in recent years. The majority of the PRC firms are within the manufacturing industry and the average payment to the senior manufacturing managers is slightly lower than (RMB 270,197) the entire sample average (RMB 293,996). Table 3 
Results
Descriptive statistics
Test of means
To test whether there are systematic differences between firms which pay excessive executive compensation and those which do not, tests of means for the full sample is performed and results are reported in Table 4 . Statistical analysis reveals that 1,490 (18.4%) of the full sample) observations are classified as paying excessive executive compensation. For the remaining 6,610 observations" executive pay is at a reasonable level. As shown in Table 4 , the PayNI ratio difference between the overpaying firms and non-overpaying group is highly significant (p<0.01). The CEO-chairman duality arrangement of firms with excessive executive compensation is also significantly higher than the counterpart. The independent director percentage of the excessive pay group is on a par with the peer group. There is a significant difference in average board size between over pay and normal pay firms (p<0.01). However, contrary to expectation, the normal pay group has a higher average board size. Whilst on average more firms in the excessive pay group (80.1%) have established a remuneration committee than counterparts (79.0%), this difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, for the period 2003 to 2009, the largest shareholders of normal pay firms have significantly greater (p<0.01) shareholding than firms that overpay. The reasonable pay group has a significant higher proportion of SOE firms than the excessive pay counterpart. Finally, consistent with the observation from Table 3 , the ownership dispersion of the overpaying group is significantly higher than the peer group (p<0.01). Where: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively (one-tailed).
Regression results
To incorporate other firm characteristics that might be expected to influence the level of executive pay, a multivariate probit regression is conducted to test the hypotheses. To mitigate any multicollinearity issue, Table 5 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations for Equation 1. As indicated in Table 5 , the highest correlation is between the ownership dispersion and shareholding of the biggest shareholder (Pearson ρ = -0.593, Spearman ρ = -0.623), and is below the deemed critical level for multicollinearity (i.e., 0.8, see Hair et al., 1995; Field, 2009) . Therefore, multicollinearity is not considered a serious concern for the regression analysis. The additional check of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores reveals that the highest VIF does not exceed the critical level which further indicates no serious multicollinearity problems. Table 6 presents the regression findings. Overall, the model is highly significant with Chi Square value significant at 0.01 level. Of the board features, in line with the expectation, the coefficient on the Dual is positive and highly significant (p<0.01). Contrary to the hypothesis, the independence of directors is positively associated with possibility of overpay. However, it is statistically insignificant. Therefore, H1a is accepted whilst H1b is rejected. Meanwhile, the coefficient on board size is positive but insignificant. Therefore, H1c is rejected. As predicted there is a negative association between the existence of the remuneration committee and likelihood of excessive compensation. But the coefficient is insignificant and H1d, thus, is not accepted. As for the ownership structure, both the top shareholding and SOE status have negative associations with the possibility of excessive executive pay. However, only the coefficient on the top shareholding is significant (p<0.01). In addition, the ownership dispersion has a significant positive coefficient. Thus, H2a and H2c are accepted while H2b is rejected. Finally, regarding the control variables, the coefficients on firm size, leverage and ROA are all significant which reveals that smaller firms with higher leverage and poor performance tend to pay executives generously. Where: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively (two-tailed).
Robustness check
Additional sensitivity tests are conducted to check the robustness of the main regression results. The Excess is replaced with an indicator variable where a firm is scored one [1] if the ratio of total cash compensation to net income of a firm is higher than industry average whilst a firm"s ROA is lower than industry average in time period t. Regression results remain the same. When the executive compensation is measured as the average compensation received by executives, directors and supervisors, the regression findings also stay largely the same. Therefore, the main findings are robust to sensitivity tests.
Conclusions
Executive compensation is a widely debated and politisized subject. The global financial crisis intensified critism of excessive executive pay that does not reflect the business performance. The PRC executives gained increased autonomy and discretion during the market-oriented reform process while weak corproate governance in PRC firms led to inadequateboard oversight and abuse of managerial power. With executive pay growing in the past decades there has been widespread concern that the senior managements in the PRC firms are overpaid. This study investigated determinants of excessive executive pay in the PRC firms. Following managerial power theory, this paper hypotheses that a strong board and proper ownership structure can constrain the possibility of excessive executive pay. By examing 8,100 firm-year observations over 7 years, results suggest that CEO duality and ownership dispersion have significant positive associations with the possibility of excessive executive pay, while the presence of a large shareholder has a negative association with likelihood of excessive executive pay. However, this study did not find board independence,board size, existence of remuneration committee or SOE status are associated with the possibility of excessive compensation.
Findings from this study have important ramifications for diretors, shareholders, stock exchanges and other PRC authorities and stakeholders. For example, the results suggest the separation of CEO-board chairman posts could reduce the possibility of executive overpay and more firms should be encouraged to adopt such an arrangement. Whilst SOE status is not foundto impact the executive overpay possibility, the presence of a large shareholder (i.e. no matter a SOE or an institutional shareholder) and less dispersed ownership do play a role in constraining the excessive executive pay. Therefore, more institutional investors, who can afford and have the expertise to oversee managers, need to be cultivated in the PRC market to strengthen the market monitoring forces. While this study did not find board independence and the establishment ofa remuneration committee helps constrain managerial power over executive compensation, it might imply the improvement in corporate governance in PRC firms needs to be in substance rather than in form. PRC stock exchanges could also consider implementing similar regulations to Taiwan Stock Exchange which publicise firms paying excessive compensation.
This study is not without limitations. Firstly, stemming from the managerial power theory, the determinants tested focus on the board features and ownership characteristics. There might be other determinants that are not incorporated. Secondly, although the measurement of the excessive executive compensation in this paper is constructed to minimise biases, it is acknowledged that it might not yet be perfect. Despite these limitations, this paper makes an original contribution to the PRC executive compensation literature. For instance, it seeks to bridge the gap between practitioners and academic benchmarking by adopting an industry-based excessive compensation assessment model. In addition, it provides unique insights into drivers of excessive executive compensation.
